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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN TAIWAN:  
CHANGES AND CHALLENGES 
Nien-Chung Chang-Liao* and Yu-Jie Chen** 
Abstract: Taiwan’s experience with transitional justice over the past three decades 
suggests that dealing with historical injustice is a dynamic and fluid process that is 
fundamentally shaped and constrained by the balance of power and socio-political reality 
in a particular transitional society. This Article provides a contextualized legal-political 
analysis of the evolution of Taiwan’s transitional justice regime, with special attention to 
its limits and challenges. Since Taiwan’s democratization began, the transitional justice 
project developed by the former authoritarian Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, 
KMT) has been rather disproportionately focused on restorative over retributive 
mechanisms, with the main emphasis placed on reparations and apology and little 
consideration of truth recovery and individual accountability. But since the Democratic 
Progressive Party began to control the government and legislature in 2016, its new 
transitional justice initiatives have introduced significant changes, including, among others, 
investigating the KMT’s “illicit party assets” and removing authoritarian symbols such as 
Chiang Kai-shek’s statues, eliciting various contentions and contestations along the way. 
In our view, Taiwan is now confronted with profound challenges in developing a holistic, 
thoughtful transitional justice regime: fierce partisan politics that could interrupt progress 
at any time, conflation of transitional justice and identity politics, pending legal 
complications and a general distrust of the judiciary, and limited public engagement in 
transitional justice issues. Whether Taiwan can continue to thrive depends on how it 
grapples with these challenges in pursuit of justice and reconciliation that will strengthen 
and sustain tomorrow’s democratic Taiwan. 
Cite as: Nien-Chung Chang-Liao & Yu-Jie Chen, Transitional Justice in Taiwan: Changes 
and Challenges, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 619 (2019). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The publication of Ernest Caldwell’s article in the Washington 
International Law Journal 1  turned academic attention to the transitional 
justice regime of Taiwan which, like many countries in Asia, suffered through 
long-lasting colonialism and authoritarian rule. It has nevertheless 
transformed into a vibrant democracy thanks to decades of the opposition’s 
persevering efforts to push democratization. Yet, despite the impressive 
progress in democratic transition, Taiwan’s experience of transitional justice 
has been under-analyzed and under-appreciated in the English-speaking world. 
Caldwell’s article, therefore, is a much-needed contribution that helps fill a 
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1  Ernest Caldwell, Transitional Justice Legislation in Taiwan Before and During the Tsai 
Administration, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 449 (2018). 
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lamentable gap in the scholarship and public discussion in East Asia and 
beyond.  
Caldwell examines the transitional justice processes in the Republic of 
China on Taiwan (Taiwan) in two phases after democratization: one from 
1987 to 2016, when the former authoritarian Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT 
or Kuomintang) controlled the presidency (1987-2000) as well as the 
legislature (1987-2016); and the other from 2016 to present, when the 
oppositional Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) controlled both the 
presidency and the legislature. Caldwell argues that the “local post-
democratization conditions”—the fact that the KMT continued to hold 
political power after lifting martial law in 1987—has greatly reduced the 
transitional justice regime to only measures of reparations and limited 
acknowledgment of past injustice, without any effort to pursue individual 
accountability and criminal liability.2  
This Article builds on and extends Caldwell’s study by providing a 
distinctive legal-political analysis of the evolution of transitional justice in 
Taiwan. In particular, we examine Taiwan’s challenges in developing a 
holistic, constructive transitional justice regime due to the extensive scope and 
scale of the historical injustice, the fierce partisan politics that could interrupt 
progress at any time, and the lukewarm public support for new initiatives, 
among others. The Article proceeds as follows. Part II lays the groundwork 
by examining the concept of transitional justice as well as a wide range of 
relevant mechanisms and different approaches under the framework of 
transitional justice. Part III calls attention to the broad scope of Taiwan’s 
transitional justice issues, offering an overview of the government oppression 
and atrocities that took place in the two periods before Taiwan’s 
democratization, i.e., the Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945) and the 
Kuomintang’s authoritarian rule (1945-1987). Part IV discusses democratic 
Taiwan’s efforts to pursue transitional justice and their limits. Finally, Part V 
evaluates the challenges that confront today’s Taiwan in developing an 
integrated transitional justice regime. 
II. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CONCEPT, MECHANISMS, AND APPROACHES 
The term transitional justice first came into use in the mid-1980s, as 
waves of political change and democratic transition swept through Latin 
America, Central and Eastern Europe, and Africa. The concept evolved as 
 
2  Id. at 480. 
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scholars sought to understand the conditions for justice after atrocity. As 
Alexander Boraine succinctly summarizes, transitional justice is “a 
convenient way of describing the search for a just society in the wake of 
undemocratic, often oppressive and even violent systems” that offers “a 
deeper, richer, and broader vision of justice which seeks to confront 
perpetrators, address the needs of victims and assist in the start of a process 
of reconciliation and transformation.” 3  In his view, accountability, truth 
recovery, reconciliation, institutional reform, and reparations are the pillars 
that support a holistic approach to transitional justice.4 Similarly, in a 2004 
report, the United Nations (UN) defined transitional justice as “the full range 
of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to 
terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice, and achieve reconciliation.”5  
In this framework, there are a panoply of mechanisms associated with 
transitional justice, including judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, such as 
truth-seeking, individual prosecutions, reparations, institutional reform, 
archives, memorialization, vetting, and dismissals.6 Despite the expansion of 
the concept of transitional justice to include a wider range of mechanisms, the 
principal objectives of transitional justice remain seeking truth and justice, 
offering redress for victims, and preventing similar tragedies from recurring.7 
Under this concept, two philosophies can be distinguished, namely, a 
“retributive” approach versus a “restorative” approach. Both approaches agree 
on public accountability for past abuses, but they differ over the mechanisms 
used in the pursuit of transitional justice. To put it simply, the retributive 
approach emphasizes measures of vetting and lustration to block perpetrators 
from power and criminal prosecution to punish them in domestic or 
international courts. It underlines the need to end impunity in the transitional 
 
3 Alexander L. Boraine, Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation, 60 J. INT'L AFF. 17, 18 (2006). 
4 Id. at 19–25. 
5  U.N. Secretary General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict 
Societies, UN Doc S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).  
6  See, e.g., David Mendeloff, Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the 
Enthusiasm?, 6 INT’L STUD. REV. 355, 357 (2004); Geoff Dancy, Choice and Consequence in Strategies of 
Transitional Justice, in THE HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR 397, 397–98 (Christopher J. 
Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers eds., 2011).  
7  These main objectives of transitional justice are concisely listed in the Special Rapporteur mandated 
by the UN Human Rights Council for transitional justice issues. See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of 
Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSION, https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/truthjusticereparation/pages/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 
2019). 
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society. 8  The purposes of transitional justice, in this view, are to pursue 
accountability, rebuild the rule of law, and deter human rights violations from 
occurring in the future. The restorative approach, on the other hand, aims to 
help victims recover from past brutality through measures of reparations, 
memorialization, and truth commissions. Much of the literature in this vein 
cautions about the consequences of a punitive approach for peace and 
reconciliation and prioritizes the objectives of providing redress for victims 
and repairing social connections that have been damaged by past conflicts.9  
This conceptual contrast is helpful in understanding the evolution of 
Taiwan’s transitional justice. The main mechanisms of transitional justice in 
Taiwan after democratization have been largely apologies, memorials, victim 
reparations, and, to some extent, institutional reforms, which follow the lines 
of a restorative approach.10 Such a path is a feature of the island’s peaceful 
transition to democracy. The lack of retributive measures in this process, 
however, has been criticized as a “transition without justice.”11 Academic and 
policy discussions increasingly focus on whether retributive elements that 
seek accountability and end immunity should be added to Taiwan’s 
transitional justice project in pursuit of a holistic approach.12  
 
8  See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations 
of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2539 (1991); Neil J.  Kriz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of 
Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1996); 
Juan E. Mendez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 255 (1997); Hunjoon Kim & Kathryn 
Sikkink, Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries, 54 
INT’L STUD. Q. 939 (2010). 
9  See, e.g., Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in 
Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT’L SECURITY 5 (2003); Mendeloff, supra note 6; Tricia D. Olsen, 
et al., The Justice Balance: When Transitional Justice Improves Human Rights and Democracy, 32 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 980 (2010); PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2011). 
10  See infra Part III. 
11  Naiteh Wu, Transition without Justice, or Justice without History: Transitional Justice in Taiwan, 
1 TAIWAN J. OF DEMOCRACY 77 (2005).  
12  See, e.g., Jun-Hong Chen (陳俊宏), Jianshi Taiwan de Zhuangxing Zhengyi zhi Lu (檢視台灣的轉
型正義之路) [Taiwan’s Path Towards Transitional Justice], 71 XINSHIJI ZHIKU LUNTAN (新世紀智庫論壇) 
[NEW CENTURY THINK TANK FORUM] 18, 20–22 (2015); Zhuanxing Zhengyi de Zhengzhi yu Falü Zhexue 
Luntan—Jiahaizhe de Guoqu yu Xianzaishi (轉型正義的政治與法律哲學論壇—加害者的過去與現在式 
[Forum Discussion: Political and Legal Philosophy of Transitional Justice—The Past and Present of the 
Perpetrators], 59 ZHENGZHI YU SHEHUI ZHEXUE LUNTAN (政治與社會哲學論壇) [SOCIETAS: A JOURNAL 
FOR PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS] 153, 168–73, 182–90, 193–96 (2016); Jonathan Chin, 
Transitional Justice Forum Says Remove Statutory Limitations on Prosecution, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 19, 2016), 
www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/04/19/2003644308.  
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III. HISTORICAL INJUSTICE BEFORE TAIWAN’S DEMOCRATIZATION  
Taiwan was a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945 and came under the 
administration of the Republic of China (ROC) government in 1945 after 
Japan surrendered in the Second World War. Both regimes sought to achieve 
their nation-building agendas on the island, often through coercive policies 
that muffled dissenting voices and repressed different identities.13 
A. Japanese Colonial Period (1895-1945) 
Taiwan and its outlying Penghu islands (Pescadores) were ceded to 
Japan in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki by the Chinese Qing Dynasty after 
the Qing lost the First Sino-Japanese war.14 Although the gentry and general 
public in Taiwan organized armed resistance to Japanese encroachment and 
even declared the establishment of a short-lived “Republic of Taiwan,” the 
result was about 14,000 Taiwanese deaths and a completion of Japanese 
occupation by the end of October 1895.15 Nevertheless, resistance against the 
colonial authorities continued, including the Tapani Incident in 1915 and the 
Wushe Incident in 1930, which were both large-scale rebellions attempted by 
the Han Taiwanese and the island’s aboriginal people, respectively.16 
Despite decades of local resistance in Taiwan, Japan was determined to 
turn the island into a model colony in Asia by means of both modernization 
and economic exploitation.17 During the first two decades of Japanese rule, 
the Taiwanese were subject to a number of harsh discriminatory policies of 
the colonial government. Native languages were banned, intensive police 
networks (baojia system) were implemented, and capital punishment became 
rampant.18 More than 5,000 Taiwanese were executed in the first decade of 
 
13  See generally Yun-han Chu & Jih-wen Lin, Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State-
Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity, 165 CHINA Q. 102 (2001); Barak 
Kushner, Nationality and Nostalgia: The Manipulation of Memory in Japan, Taiwan, and China since 1990, 
29 INT’L HIST.  REV. 793 (2007). 
14  Harry J. Lamley, Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism, in 
TAIWAN: A NEW HISTORY 201, 203 (Murray A. Rubinstein ed., 2007); Wan-Yao Chou, Taiwan Under 
Japanese Rule (1895-1945), in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY TAIWAN 22, 25–26 (Gunter 
Schubert ed., 2016). 
15  Id.; see also J. BRUCE JACOBS, DEMOCRATIZING TAIWAN 26 (2012). 
16  Chou, supra note 14, at 26–29. 
17  Kushner, supra note 13, at 811 (stating that the Japanese colonial administration intended to reform 
Taiwan to be “the showcase for Japanese modernization throughout Asia”); see also Lamley, supra note 14, 
at 201, 209. 
18  Chu & Lin, supra note 13, at 106.   
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Japanese rule, including those who committed only minor offenses. Those 
who survived suffered torture and forced labor.19 In addition, Taiwanese were 
excluded from the government and had no right to serve in the military.20 As 
armed struggles against the colonial government became increasingly futile, 
the anti-government movements gradually shifted to the pursuit of self-
determination and more political autonomy.21 
Beginning in the early 1920s, the colonial government began to employ 
assimilation policies that aimed to introduce Japanese institutions and 
regulations into Taiwan. 22  The Taiwanese were required to learn to be 
Japanese subjects and were given more political space, such as having the 
eligibility to be elected or appointed to local councils. 23  They were also 
granted the opportunity of pursuing university studies in Japan.24  
The start of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 further intensified 
Japan’s efforts of assimilation and “Japanization” of the island (kominka, 
literally, “to make [the Taiwanese] the Emperor’s people”).25 The Taiwanese 
were educated as subjects of the Japanese emperor and were mobilized to join 
the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. More than 200,000 Taiwanese, out of 
a total population of 6.5 million, were conscripted into Japan’s war against 
China and later against the Allied forces in the Pacific War, and approximately 
30,000 of them died in that service.26 Furthermore, much like women from 
the rest of Japan’s newly conquered Empire, notably Korea and parts of China, 
between 1,200 to 2,000 Taiwanese women were forced to work as sex slaves 
(known as “comfort women”) for the Japanese military during the Second 
World War. 27  It was thus not surprising that after Japan announced its 
surrender in 1945, the arrival of 30,000 Nationalist troops in Taipei was 
greeted by crowds enthusiastic about the prospect of joining China. 28 
 
19  Lamley, supra note 14, at 241. 
20  Id.  
21  Chu & Lin, supra note 13, at 106–07. 
22  Chou, supra note 14, at 29–30. 
23  Chu & Lin, supra note 13, at 109. 
24  Chou, supra note 14, at 29–30. 
25  Chu & Lin, supra note 13, at 110. 
26  Victor Louzon, From Japanese Soldiers to Chinese Rebels: Colonial Hegemony, War Experience, 
and Spontaneous Remobilization During the 1947 Taiwanese Rebellion, 77 J. ASIAN STUD. 161, 164 (2017). 
27  See generally YOSHIAKI YOSHIMI, COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL SLAVERY IN THE JAPANESE 
MILITARY DURING WORLD WAR II (2000). 
28  SHEENA CHESTNUT GREITENS, DICTATORS AND THEIR SECRET POLICE: COERCIVE INSTITUTIONS 
AND STATE VIOLENCE 184 (2016).   
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B. The Kuomintang Government (1945-1987) 
Taiwan’s fate was once again changed by a war. After Japan 
surrendered in 1945, the victorious Allied forces placed Taiwan under the 
military administration of the ROC, 29  which had succeeded the Imperial 
Chinese Government in 1912 and which had been under the control of 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT since 1927. The ROC promptly 
integrated Taiwan into its national government system. Meanwhile, the 
Chinese continent was engulfed in a civil war between Chiang Kai-shek’s 
KMT and Mao Zedong’s Communist forces.  
Although many Taiwanese had opposed Japanese rule and welcomed 
Taiwan’s return to China, they were viewed by those on the mainland as 
lacking loyalty to the ROC as well as being ideologically tainted by decades 
of Japanese rule.30 Native Taiwanese (benshengren, “people of this province 
[of Taiwan]”) were barred from political participation, while Mainland 
Chinese who settled in Taiwan shortly before the KMT’s 1949 retreat to the 
island (waishengren, “people from other provinces”) monopolized key power 
positions in Taiwanese society.31 In addition, the newly installed Chinese 
administration’s corruption and incompetence brought the island to the verge 
of economic collapse, posing a stark contrast to the relative stability of 
Japanese rule in the eyes of many Taiwanese. 32  The initial jubilation of 
“returning to the motherland” on the island soon gave way to a sobering mood 
of disillusionment and dissatisfaction.33 
The distinction between the so-called benshengren and waishengren is 
important in understanding Taiwan’s history and political divide. 34  After 
Chiang Kai-shek’s troops arrived in Taiwan in 1945, tensions began to rise 
between local benshengren and their newly-arrived waishengren rulers. 
Conflict along this divide finally exploded on February 28, 1947 to become 
 
29  For studies of Taiwan’s political situation in the early days of the ROC rule, see TSE-HAN LAI, 
RAMON MYERS & WOU WEI, A TRAGIC BEGINNING: THE TAIWAN UPRISING OF FEBRUARY 28, 1947 (1991); 
Steven Phillips, Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations Under Nationalist 
Chinese Rule, 1945-1948, in TAIWAN: A NEW HISTORY 275 (Murray A. Rubinstein ed., 2007). 
30  Chu & Lin, supra note 13, at 112; Cheng-feng Shih & Mumin Chen, Taiwanese Identity and the 
Memories of 2-28: A Case for Political Reconciliation, 34 ASIAN PERSP. 85, 91 (2010). 
31  See Shih & Chen, supra note 30, at 88–98. 
32  Chu & Lin, supra note 13, at 112; Shih & Chen, supra note 30, at 91. 
33  Id. 
34  For a discussion of how these identities have been developed, see Shih & Chen, supra note 30, at 
88–90. 
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an island-wide popular uprising against the Chinese provincial administration. 
The resistance was brutally suppressed by reinforcing troops from the 
mainland.35 In this notorious “2-28 Incident,” an estimated 18,000 to 28,000 
Taiwanese were killed, including many of the island’s intellectuals and social 
elites who had demanded political reforms.36  
Two years after the 2-28 massacre, the Nationalist government, after 
losing the mainland in the civil war with the Chinese Communist Party, 
retreated to Taiwan along with hundreds of thousands of waishengren troops 
and refugees.37 Chiang made Taiwan his last bastion for resisting the People’s 
Republic of China established by Mao Zedong on the mainland and imposed 
on the island what would become the world’s longest-prevailing martial law 
decree (1949-1987). 
During the lengthy martial law rule, political rights and civil liberties 
were severely restricted. The KMT government employed criminal charges 
and court-martials as the main tools to suppress any political dissidents, 
including both benshengren and waishengren. 38  Alongside these tactics, 
under vaguely-worded sedition laws, including Article 100 of the Criminal 
Code, any non-violent opposition to the regime could be interpreted as a threat 
to the state and therefore severely punished.39 An official report estimated that, 
during this period, approximately 29,000 political trials took place and 
 
35  For detailed accounts on the 2-28 Incident, see LAI ET AL., supra note 29, at 99–167; STEVEN E. 
PHILLIPS, BETWEEN ASSIMILATION AND INDEPENDENCE: THE TAIWANESE ENCOUNTER NATIONALIST CHINA, 
1945-1950 (2003). 
36  These numbers were based on a multi-volume report release by the Executive Yuan in 1993, 
although the actual numbers killed remain unknown and disputed. The official report was later published as 
a book. XINZHENGYUAN YANJIU ERERBA SHIJIAN XIAOZU (行政院研究二二八事件小組) [TASK FORCE OF 
THE EXECUTIVE YUAN ON THE 2-28 INCIDENT], ‘ERERBA SHIJIAN’ YANJIU BAOGAO (「二二八事件」研究
報告) [RESEARCH REPORT OF THE 2-28 INCIDENT] (1994).  
37  Stéphane Corcuff, Taiwan’s “Mainlanders,” New Taiwanese?, in MEMORIES OF THE FUTURE: 
NATIONAL IDENTITY ISSUES AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW TAIWAN 163, 164 (Stephane Corcuff ed., 2002).  
38  Wu, supra note 11. 
39  Chun-hung Chen & Han-hui Chung, Unfinished Democracy: Transitional Justice in Taiwan, in 4 
STUDIA Z POLITYKI PUBLICZNEJ (PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES) 13, 32, 24 (2016) (“Article 100, paragraph 1 states: 
the one who intended and began to implement damage to the state, usurpation of the land or change of the 
country’s constitution by illegal means, subversion of the government, could be sentenced to seven years’ 
imprisonment, and the first colluder would be sentenced to life imprisonment. The second paragraph: the one 
who prepares or conspires to commit the previously mentioned crimes could be sentenced to imprisonment, 
at least six months to five years. It means that not only could the conspirators be punished, and the idea of 
‘begin to implement’ was not only limited to the use of violent and coercive methods, but also the common 
crime of insurrection could be committed on grounds of the ideological level.”). 
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resulted in 3,000 to 4,000 executions.40 Among them, at least one-third were 
waishengren, who comprised only fifteen percent of the population.41 This 
suggested that both benshengren and waishengren were victims of state 
atrocities during this period, which is now commonly referred to as the White 
Terror. 
The latter half of the 1970s again saw rising political activism, but the 
appetite of the new dictator, Chiang Ching-kuo (Chiang Kai-shek’s son), for 
liberalism proved to be limited. His government infamously quashed 
protesters in what culminated in the “Kaohsiung Incident,” where police and 
protesters clashed in a rally held by opposition activists to recognize 
International Human Rights Day on December 10, 1979.42 Members of the 
dissident magazine Formosa (Meilidao) implicated in the protest were 
convicted on charges of subversion.43 Prior to the trial, the mother of Lin Yi-
hsiung, one of the Meilidao defendants, contacted Amnesty International to 
enlist international support for activists.44 She and Lin’s twin daughters were 
murdered immediately thereafter while Lin and seven other primary 
defendants were sentenced to long prison terms ranging from twelve years to 
life.45 The Kaohsiung Incident, however, did not inhibit the expansion of 
opposition forces (Dangwai, literally “outside the Party, i.e., KMT”) in the 
1980s.46 Finally, in 1986, democratic activists from Dangwai founded the 
DPP. This time, Chiang Ching-kuo did not crack down on the organizers. In 
light of mounting domestic and international pressures to democratize Taiwan, 
in 1987, the KMT government lifted the world’s longest term of martial law, 
which opened up the processes of democratization and later of transitional 
justice. 
 
 
40  TING-CHAO WEI (魏廷朝), TAWAIN RENQUAN BAOGAO SHU 1945-1995 (台灣人權報告書一九四
九-一九九五) [REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN TAIWAN, 1945-1995] (1997). 
41  GREITENS, supra note 28, at 183–84.   
42  For the Kaohsiung Incident, see JOHN KAPLAN, THE COURT-MARTIAL OF THE KAOHSIUNG 
DEFENDANTS (1981); DENNY ROY, TAIWAN: A POLITICAL HISTORY 167–69 (2002). 
43  ROY, supra note 42, at 168–69. 
44  Id. at 169. 
45  KAPLAN, supra note 42, at 46. 
46  For the formation and organization of domestic opposition in Taiwan following the Kaohsiung 
Incident, see XIAO-FENG LI (李筱峰), TAWAIN MINZHU YUNDONG SISHI NIAN (台灣民主運動四十年) 
[FORTY YEARS OF TAIWAN’S DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT] (1987). 
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IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN TAIWAN 
Taiwan’s democratic regime has drawn on a limited number of 
transitional justice mechanisms, including apology, reparations, 
memorialization and, to a lesser extent, legal reforms and truth recovery. This 
process, as Caldwell and other scholars rightly point out, is marked by a lack 
of retributive measures of prosecution and lustration due to the fact that the 
former authoritarian party, the KMT, remained in power for a long time after 
democratization began.47  
Moreover, the focal point of Taiwan’s transitional justice has so far 
been the 2-28 massacre, less so the White Terror period, and least of all the 
human rights abuses during Japanese colonial rule. In our view, this uneven 
development that targets KMT abuses (with meager regard for Japanese 
colonial atrocities) can be attributed to several factors. First, the introduction 
of free and competitive elections during democratization meant that 
Taiwanese party politics would be aligned more closely with the benshengren 
constituency (the majority of the population) and their interests. Therefore, 
the 2-28 massacre—the watershed tragedy early in the KMT’s rule that 
targeted benshengren elites and divided benshengren and waishengren for 
generations to come—has become the center of attention; other issues, 
especially those concerning Japanese colonial abuses, were more or less 
crowded out. Second, for the KMT to gain legitimacy and the trust of the 
voting public, it adopted the responsiveness required of a party in a democratic 
system and attempted to address its past wrongs, albeit in a very measured and 
limited way. Instituting mostly restorative transitional justice measures, such 
as monetary reparations, apologies and memorials, and acknowledging 
responsibility to the extent that its political power would not be undermined 
appeared to be a logical pathway for the KMT. Third, while Japan’s 
governance was indeed discriminatory and exploitative, it may have appeared 
relatively less punitive to the public when compared to the KMT’s cruel 
terror.48 This accounts for a constituency in Taiwan that is more sympathetic 
to Japan’s colonial period than to the KMT’s rule.49 Last but not least, the 
 
47  Caldwell, supra note 1; Wu, supra note 11; Jau-Yuan Hwang, Transitional Justice in Postwar 
Taiwan, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY TAIWAN 169, 171 (Gunter Schubert ed., 2016) 
(“Taiwan’s effort in pursuit of transitional justice has focused mainly and mostly on victim reparations, less 
on truth-finding and institutional reforms, and least on wrongdoers’ liabilities.”); Chen, supra note 12, at 20. 
48  Chu and Lin, supra note 13, at 111–12. 
49  Shogo Suzuki, The Competition to Attain Justice for Past Wrongs: The "Comfort Women" Issue in 
Taiwan, 84 PAC. AFF. 223, 233–34 (2011). 
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passage of time has added to the difficulty of pursuing accountability for 
abuses dating back to Japanese rule.  
A. Taiwan’s Transitional Justice Regime until 2016 
Despite intense partisan political feelings, there was scant popular 
demand for a transition of power or transitional justice right after 
democratization. The KMT’s eventual defeat in the presidential election in 
2000 also did not result in public clamor for retribution. Furthermore, the 
KMT was able to return to power through the ballot box from 2008 to 2016.50 
Advocates of a more holistic approach towards transitional justice measures 
in Taiwan, thus, faced grave difficulties in building broad-based social 
support for their cause. Only in 2016 when the KMT lost both presidential and 
parliamentary elections to the DPP was more deliberation given to transitional 
justice, including retributive measures, in the new government and legislature. 
The very beginning of Taiwan’s transitional justice project was made 
possible in the 1990s, when President Lee Teng-hui, who assumed the KMT 
leadership after Chiang Ching-kuo’s death in 1988 and is a benshengren 
himself, pursued a policy of apology, memorials, and compensation and, to 
some extent, truth-seeking. Under Lee’s stewardship, an official committee 
on the 2-28 Incident was set up in 1990 under the Executive Yuan and later 
published its findings in an investigative report in 1992.51 In the same year, 
Lee issued an official apology for the 2-28 Incident and announced February 
28 a national holiday.52 In 1995, Taiwan’s legislature, the Legislative Yuan, 
passed the “February 28 Incident Disposition and Compensation Act” [二二
八事件處理及補償條例] (2-28 Act).53 The aim of this Act, according to 
 
50  Although the KMT lost the presidential election in 2000, it still enjoyed a majority in the Legislative 
Yuan until 2016. The KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, won a landslide victory in the 2008 presidential election.  
51  See Task Force of the Executive Yuan on the 2-28 Incident, supra note 36. 
52  Nicholas D. Kristof, Taipei Journal; The Horror of 2-28: Taiwan Rips Open the Past, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 3, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/03/world/taipei-journal-the-horror-of-2-28-taiwan-rips-
open-the-past.html.  
53  The wording “buchang” (補償) in the Act was later replaced by “peichang” (賠償) to reflect the 
nature of the compensation. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 468 (“With very little media attention or legislative 
debate, the amendment changed the term to “peichang” (賠償), which denotes a form of compensation for a 
harm resulting from an illegal act.”). Ererba Shijian Chuli ji Peichang Tiaoli (二二八事件處理及賠償條例) 
[The February 28th Incident Disposition and Compensation Act] (promulgated by the Legislative Yuan, 
effective Apr. 7, 1995, last amended Jan. 17, 2018) (Taiwan). 
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Article 1, was “to enhance public understanding of the incident, to heal the 
wounds of history, and to promote racial integration.”54 
B. Apology and Memorials  
Following the 1995 2-28 Act, Taiwan’s successive presidents, either 
from the KMT or the DPP, continued to issue an annual apology for the 2-28 
Incident on behalf of the government. Some memorials and human rights 
museums were established for this purpose, including the 2-28 Memorial Park 
in central Taipei. By appealing to healing and forgiveness, President Lee 
defused a ticking time bomb of benshengren-waishengren conflict in 
Taiwanese society that had surfaced with the island’s democratization and 
subsequent political competition.55 In 1996, President Lee won a landslide 
victory in Taiwan’s first presidential election (despite fierce competition from 
other candidates and China’s missile threats prior to the election).56 As Steve 
Tsang observes, the success of Lee Teng-huei’s transitional justice initiative 
was aided by his concept of “New Taiwanese” that would give all citizens of 
the ROC—including both waishengren and benshengren—a new identity to 
share.57 This new Taiwanese identity stood in vivid contrast with that of the 
People’s Republic of China, which was separated not only by the Taiwan 
Strait, but also by the growing divergence between the two different political 
systems.58 
The 2-28 massacre was not the only historical memory to come to light 
in the wake of Taiwan’s democratization. The extensive, long-standing White 
Terror, while receiving less attention than the shocking 2-28 tragedy, 
gradually entered the public discourse. While the 2-28 Incident came to 
symbolize KMT political repression and the victimization of the Taiwanese 
benshengren, the victims of the White Terror were waishengren as well as 
 
54  Later in 2014, two additional goals were added to Article 1, namely “to carry out the education of 
history,” and “to clarify attribution of responsibility.” 
55  Chu & Lin, supra note 13, at 122 (Lee “helped construct a new foundation for the legitimacy of the 
ROC state structure without violent internal polarization and external military intervention”). 
56  Aiming at influencing Taiwan’s first presidential election in 1996, China conducted a series of 
missile tests and military exercises near the island’s coast from July 1995 to March 1996. For a detailed 
account, see JOHN W. GARVER, FACE OFF: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND TAIWAN'S DEMOCRATIZATION 
(1997). 
57  Steve Tsang, Democratisation in a Chinese Community: Lessons from Taiwan, in TAIWAN IN THE 
21ST CENTURY: ASPECTS AND LIMITATIONS OF A DEVELOPMENT MODEL 177, 186 (Robert Ash & J. Megan 
Greene eds., 2007); see also Shih & Chen, supra note 30, at 101 (“While retaining the Chinese cultural 
identity, Lee upheld Taiwanese political identity.”). 
58  Tsang, supra note 57, at 186. 
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benshengren. In particular, much of the state violence was concentrated 
among the KMT’s own officials, police, intelligence and military personnel.59 
Yet, compared to the 2-28 Incident, the White Terror has received far less 
official commemoration and, thus, lower political priority in the process of 
transitional justice in Taiwan. Only in 2008 was the first monument to the 
White Terror victims commissioned by the government. A few years later, 
two notorious former military prisons for political dissidents (on Green Island 
and in Jingmei, New Taipei City) were transformed into Human Rights 
Memorial Parks to register human rights abuses during the White Terror.60 
C. Compensation  
A framework of reparations was put in place to compensate victims of 
the authoritarian rule and their families.61 For the 2-28 massacre, the 2-28 
Memorial Foundation [二二八事件紀念基金會] was established by the 
government in 1995 to provide monetary compensation capped at a maximum 
of US $180,000 per person.62 As of the end of its operation in 2014, the 2-28 
Memorial Foundation had received a total of 2,278 applications and had 
compensated 9,883 individuals in payouts amounting to US $239 million.63  
Victims of the White Terror and their heirs received reparations in 
accordance with the 1995 Act Governing the Recovery of Damage of 
Individual Rights during the Period of Martial Law [戒嚴時期人民受損權利
回復條例] (Martial Law Recovery Act)64 and the 1998 Compensation Act for 
Wrongful Trials on Charges of Sedition and Espionage during the Martial 
Law Period [戒嚴時期不當叛亂暨匪諜審判案件補償條例] (Wrongful 
Trials Compensation Act).65 The Foundation for Compensation for Wrongful 
Trials on Charges of Sedition and Espionage during the Martial Law Period 
[戒嚴時期不當叛亂暨匪諜審判案件補償基金會 ] was created in 
 
59  GREITENS, supra note 28, at 195–96. 
60  Hwang, supra note 47, at 176. 
61  For a discussion of the various measures of reparations, see Caldwell, supra note 1, at 426–27. 
62  Hwang, supra note 47, at 174. 
63  Id. 
64  Jieyan Shiqi Renmin Shousun Quanli Huifu Tiaoli (戒嚴時期人民受損權利回復條例) [The Act 
Governing the Recovery of Damage of Individual Rights during the Period of Martial Law] (promulgated by 
the Legislative Yuan, effective Jan. 28, 1995, last amended Feb. 2, 2000) (Taiwan).  
65  Jieyan Shiqi Budang Panluan ji Feidie Shenpan Anjian Buchang Tiaoli (戒嚴時期不當叛亂暨匪
諜審判案件補償條例) [The Compensation Act for Wrongful Trials on Charges of Sedition and Espionage 
during the Martial Law Period] (promulgated by the Legislative Yuan, effective June 17, 1998, last amended 
Dec. 18, 2006) (Taiwan).  
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accordance with the 1998 Wrongful Trials Compensation Act. By the end of 
its operation, the Foundation had accepted a total of 10,066 applications and 
provided monetary compensation totaling roughly US $660 million. 66  It 
should be noted that, despite this compensation scheme, there remains a 
problem of providing full redress to people who had property confiscated in 
court-martial proceedings.67  
Despite the above efforts, many victims did not get their names cleared 
until almost three decades later.68 Article 9 of the National Security Act [國
家安全法],69  which was passed on the eve of the lifting of martial law, 
prohibited civilians from appealing their convictions by court-martials to the 
higher courts. The constitutionality of Article 9 was upheld by the Grand 
Justices in Interpretation No. 272 in 1991 for the sake of maintaining “the 
stability of the courts’ final decisions and the social order.”70 Consequently, 
the right to challenge the legality of military trials against civilians during the 
White Terror period was severely restricted.71  
D. Reforms 
Pressure from Taiwanese society and the DPP prompted the KMT 
government to institute some legal reforms. For example, in May 1992, the 
Legislative Yuan, in response to mass protests, amended Article 100 of the 
Criminal Code to include freedom of speech protections. 72  With this 
amendment, non-violent advocacy of Taiwanese independence was no longer 
illegal. More than ten persons charged with advocating Taiwanese 
independence in the previous year were released.73 A month later, the Second 
 
66  Hwang, supra note 47, at 174. 
67  Chen, supra note 12, at 24 (noting that according to the Act Governing the Recovery of Damage of 
Individual Rights during the Period of Martial Law, only those who have received an acquittal are entitled to 
demand the return of confiscated property; however, since Article 9 of the National Security Act prohibits 
civilians from appealing their convictions by court-martials to the higher courts, many victims have not been 
allowed to obtain acquittal).  
68  See infra note 110 and the accompanying text. 
69  Guojia Anquan Fa (國家安全法) [National Security Act] (promulgated by the Legislative Yuan, 
effective July 15, 1987, last amended Aug. 21, 2013) (Taiwan). 
70  Sifayuan Dafaguan (司法院大法官) [Grand Justices], Interpretation No. 272 (Jan. 18, 1991), 
available at https://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=272.  
71  Caldwell, supra note 1, at 460–62. 
72  Winston Hsiao, The Development of Human Rights in the Republic of China on Taiwan: 
Ramifications of Recent Democratic Reforms and Problems of Enforcement, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 161, 
181 (1995). 
73  JACOBS, supra note 15, at 83–84. 
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Personnel Office under the Ministry of Justice, which was in charge of a 
“loyalty” check on all governmental employees, was dismantled.74 In July of 
the same year, the government dissolved the Taiwan Garrison Command, 
which was once the most feared security agency of the authoritarian era.75 
E. Lack of Individual Accountability  
Despite these measures, however, there has been little progress in 
pursuing legal recourse against those who should be held responsible for the 
abuses.76 The 2-28 Act, the Martial Law Recovery Act, and the Wrongful 
Trials Compensation Act, while acknowledging the loss and harm inflicted on 
the victims, do not address the responsibility of the perpetrators. For example, 
although the 2-28 Act acknowledges the need for fact-finding about the 
incident (Article 3), the language shies away from criminal liability and 
individual accountability. 77  Nor has any single individual or government 
agency been officially named as a wrongdoer for the White Terror era.  
In 2006, the DPP government, without the support of the KMT-
dominated legislature, identified Chiang Kai-shek as the primary culprit of the 
2-28 Incident, leading to the renaming of the Chiang Kai-shek International 
Airport as the Taoyuan International Airport, and the Chiang Kai-shek 
Memorial Hall as the National Taiwan Democratic Memorial Hall.78 Despite 
this, Chiang’s responsibility for the 2-28 massacre has never been officially 
acknowledged.79 In 2008, when the KMT returned to power, the National 
Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall was renamed the Chiang Kai-shek 
Memorial Hall.80  
Scholars Chun-hung Chen and Han-hui Chung note that as a result of 
avoiding discussion of official and personal responsibility, “many institutional 
inflictors or cooperators of the system continued to be in key positions in the 
government after democratization, which resulted in the prevalence of 
 
74  Id. 
75  Id. at 84. 
76  Caldwell, supra note 1, at 466. 
77  Id. at 464 (noting that the language of the 2-28 Act “shelters individual members of the KMT from 
criminal or civil liability or even official acknowledgment of their participation”).  
78  See Christian Schafferer, Consolidation of Democracy and Historical Legacies: A Case Study of 
Taiwan, 9 J. CONTEMP. E. ASIA 25–27 (2010). 
79  Hwang, supra note 47, at 176.  
80  Flora Wang, Chiang Kai-shek Plaque to Return to Memorial Hall, TAIPEI TIMES (Jan. 22, 2009), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/01/22/2003434392. 
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impunity.” 81  However, in recent years, civic groups and scholars have 
succeeded in blocking a few nominations of Constitutional Court justices on 
the grounds that their work had facilitated the authoritarian government’s 
persecution of democracy activists.82 Yet these protests against controversial 
nominations are sporadic. Some, therefore, advocate for a lustration law in 
Taiwan to ensure those in important government positions played no role in 
past authoritarian abuse.83 
In summary, until 2016, the practice of transitional justice measures in 
Taiwan maintained a restorative focus without retributive elements. Many 
victims have appeared dissatisfied with the apologies and compensation 
offered by the government, and advocates of a holistic approach towards 
transitional justice are unconvinced that the country has truly come to terms 
with its past.84 From their perspective, justice and reconciliation cannot be 
genuinely achieved without the introduction of retributive measures such as 
prosecution and lustration, which they argue are important for the fulfillment 
of the rule of law and accountability. 
F. Taiwan’s Transitional Justice Regime Since 2016 
In 2016, nearly three decades after Taiwan’s democratization, 
transitional justice gained new prominence in Taiwan’s political discourse as 
the DPP won both the presidential and parliamentary election for the first time. 
When President Tsai Ing-wen assumed office, she vowed to enhance 
transitional justice efforts and to set up a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission inside the presidential office85 for the pursuit of “true social 
reconciliation.” 86  Since 2016, there have been several novel initiatives, 
 
81  Chen & Chung, supra note 39, at 32.  
82  See, e.g., Hsiang Cheng-chen & Jonathan Chin, Judicial Yuan Nominee Denies White Terror Roles, 
TAIPEI TIMES (July 20, 2016), www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/07/20/2003651410; Justice 
Ministry Slammed for Recommending Martial Law-era Military Prosecutor, FORMOSA NEWS (Mar. 13, 
2015), https://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/Read.aspx?sno=F97590F139A8DCC138D7AE6749663BB0.  
83  See, e.g., Forum Discussion: Political and Legal Philosophy of Transitional Justice—The Past and 
Present of the Perpetrators, supra note 12. 
84  Id. 
85  As of January 2019, such a Commission had yet to be established. On the potential of a truth and 
reconciliation policy as a geopolitical strategy, see Ian Rowen & Jamie Rowen, Taiwan’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Committee: The Geopolitics of Transitional Justice in a Contested State, 11 INT’L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 92 (2017).  
86  Ing-wen Tsai, President, Republic of China, Inaugural Address of ROC 14th-Term President Tsai 
Ing-wen (May 20, 2016) (transcript available at https://english.president.gov.tw/News/4893).  
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including new transitional justice legislation and institutions, as well as 
innovative efforts to promote indigenous justice.  
On August 1, 2016, President Tsai issued Taiwan’s first-ever official 
apology to the indigenous peoples for “four centuries of pain and mistreatment” 
imposed on them.87 She acknowledged that the aboriginal people—whom she 
described as “Taiwan’s original owners”—had suffered under the island’s 
successive rulers: the Dutch colonizers, the Koxinga Kingdom, the Qing 
Empire, Colonial Japan, and finally the post-war ROC regime.88 She declared 
the establishment of an Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice 
Committee [原住民族歷史正義與轉型正義委員會] (Indigenous Justice 
Committee) 89  inside the presidential office to promote the equality and 
welfare of indigenous people. The Indigenous Justice Committee has set up 
subcommittees on five themes: land, culture, language, history, and 
reconciliation. Major initiatives include publishing fact-finding reports on 
indigenous lands, cultures, languages and history; reviewing conflicts 
between current legislation and indigenous peoples’ traditions and customs; 
preserving indigenous languages and promoting indigenous education; and 
recommending measures of reconciliation, reparations, or compensation.90 
The Indigenous Justice Committee has elicited a government pledge to 
remove the 100,000 barrels of nuclear waste that have been stored on Orchid 
Island where the Yami people reside, a major problem that Taiwanese 
aboriginal communities have protested for decades.91 The Indigenous Justice 
Committee has also facilitated a series of negotiations on possibly closing a 
controversial mine in the Truku indigenous lands.92 Progress, however, has 
been extremely slow.93  
 
87  Ing-wen Tsai, President, Republic of China, President Tsai Apologizes to Indigenous Peoples on 
Behalf of Government (Aug. 1, 2016) (transcript available at https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/4950).   
88  Id. 
89  PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE INDIGENOUS HISTORICAL JUSTICE AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE, 
https://indigenous-justice.president.gov.tw/EN.  
90  Id. 
91  Nick Aspinwall, Taiwan’s Indigenous Are Still Seeking Justice On The Democratic Side Of The 
Taiwan Strait, SUPCHINA (Feb. 13, 2019), https://supchina.com/2019/02/13/taiwans-indigenous-are-still-
seeking-justice/. 
92  Jeffrey Warner, Asia Cement: Following Rules or Pit Mining Human Rights?, THENEWSLENS (Dec. 
6, 2017), https://international.thenewslens.com/article/84693.  
93  The government has not been able to find a location to transfer nuclear waste from Orchid Island, 
and the mine in the Truku indigenous lands has not been closed as of this writing. Matthew Strong, Taiwan 
Still Unable to Find US Company Willing to Take Radioactive Waste, TAIWAN NEWS (July 3, 2018), 
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3472965; Matthew Strong, Taiwan to Complete Repackaging of 
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Among the new transitional justice policies, more controversial is the 
initiative to recover assets acquired by the KMT during its authoritarian period, 
some of which were later transferred to private organizations during 
democratization. In July 2016, the DPP-dominated Legislative Yuan swiftly 
passed the Act Governing the Handling of Ill-Gotten Assets by Political 
Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations [政黨及其附隨組織不當取得財產
處理條例]94 (Illicit Assets Act), under which an “Ill-Gotten Party Assets 
Settlement Committee” [不當黨產處理委員會] was created to determine 
what assets should be returned to the government or the original owners.95 
The Ill-Gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee is organized under the 
Executive Yuan, and its members (11–13 people) are selected by the Premier.  
As of December 2018, the Committee had frozen assets worth billions 
of dollars of private companies and non-governmental organizations that were 
determined to be KMT affiliates, including the Central Investment Company, 
Hsinyutai Co, Chinese Women’s League, and China Youth Corps.96 These 
groups have filed ongoing lawsuits challenging the Committee’s action. 
Moreover, the constitutionality of the Illicit Assets Act has also been 
questioned. In 2018, the Control Yuan, whose members were mostly 
nominated by the previous KMT president, filed a petition with the 
Constitutional Court, arguing that many provisions of the Illicit Assets Act 
should be deemed unconstitutional for violating the principles of due process, 
rule of law, legal certainty, and the constitutional protection of property rights, 
among others.97 The Constitutional Court subsequently dismissed the Control 
Yuan’s petition on procedural grounds that the Control Yuan had no legal 
 
Orchid Island Nuclear Waste in 2020, TAIWAN NEWS (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/ 
news/3551729.   
94  Zhengdang ji Qi Fusui Zuzhi Budang Qude Caichang Chuli Tiaoli (政黨及其附隨組織不當取得
財產處理條例) [The Act Governing the Handling of Ill-Gotten Assets by Political Parties and Their Affiliate 
Organizations] (promulgated by the Legislative Yuan, effective Aug. 10, 2016) (Taiwan). 
95  Id. art. 2. 
96  Benhui yi Zhuihui Caichang Gaikuang (本會已追回財產概況) [Summary of the Returned Assets], 
BUDANG DANGCHAN CHULI WEIYUANHUI ( 不當黨產處理委員會 ) [ILL-GOTTEN PARTY ASSETS 
SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE] (Dec. 18. 2018), https://www.cipas.gov.tw/news/232; Chen Wei-han, Women’s 
League Declared KMT Affiliate, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb. 2, 2018), www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/ 
2018/02/02/2003686871; China Youth Corps Determined to be KMT-Affiliated, All Assets Frozen, TAIWAN 
NEWS (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3501385.  
97  Chen Wei-han, Control Yuan Queries Party Assets Law, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), 
www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2017/03/29/2003667669. For a detailed account of the Control 
Yuan's investigation of the Illicit Assets Act, see Jiancha Yuan (監察院) [Control Yuan], Diaocha Baogao 
( 調查報告 ) [Investigation Report], JIANCHAYUAN ( 監察院 ) [CONTROL YUAN] (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.cy.gov.tw/sp.asp?xdURL=./di/RSS/detail.asp&ctNode=871&mp=1&no=5130.  
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standing in such a case.98 However, two more constitutional petitions have 
now been filed by trial court judges handling related cases.99 It remains to be 
seen whether the Court will decide on those petitions. These legal challenges, 
which are serious and debatable, suggest that the prospect of carrying out the 
Illicit Assets Act is far from certain.  
In December 2017, the Legislative Yuan passed the Act on the 
Promotion of Transitional Justice” [促進轉型正義條例]100  (Transitional 
Justice Act), a general, comprehensive framework that covers a wide range of 
initiatives with four primary goals: 101  (1) opening political archives; (2) 
removing authoritarian symbols and preserving sites where injustices were 
committed; (3) redressing judicial wrongs, restoring historical truth, and 
promoting social reconciliation; and (4) settling and utilizing ill-gotten party 
assets. A Commission to Promote Transitional Justice [促進轉型正義委員
會] (Transitional Justice Commission) was established under the Executive 
Yuan. Its mandate is to address all the transitional justice issues, except for 
the work of indigenous transitional justice, which is handled by the 
Indigenous Justice Committee. The nine members of the Transitional Justice 
 
98  Justices Dismiss Control Yuan Request, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2018/10/08/2003701956. For the Constitutional Court’s 
reasoning, see Dafaguan Shuji Chu (大法官書記處) [Secretariat of Taiwan’s Grand Justices], Sifayuan 
Dafaguan Di 1482 Ci Huiyi Bushouli Jueyi Di Si An Jianchayuan Shengqing’an Bushouli Jueyi Zhaiyao (司
法院大法官第 1482次會議不受理決議第四案監察院聲請案不受理決議摘要) [Summary of the Decision 
of Dismissing the Control Yuan’s Petition in Meeting no. 1482 of the Grand Justices], Sifayuan Daifaguan 
( 司 法 院 大 法 官 ) [Grand Justices, Judicial Yuan] (Oct. 5, 2018), 
https://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p10_02.asp?id=373658.  
99  Zuigao Xingzheng Fayuan jiu 107 Nniandu Caizi Di 1150 Hao Budang Dangchan Chuli 
Weiyuanhui yu Guomindang, Zhongyang Touzi Gufenyouxian Gongsi, Xinyutai Gufenyouxian Gongsi Jian 
Zhengdang ji Qi Fusui Zuzhi Budang Qude Caichan Chuli Tiaoli (Tingzhi Susong Chengxu) Shijian 
Xinwengao (最高行政法院就 107 年度裁字第 1150 號不當黨產處理委員會與國民黨、中央投資股份
有限公司、欣裕台股份有限公司間政黨及其附隨組織不當取得財產處理條例（停止訴訟程序）事件
新聞稿) [Supreme Administrative Court’s Press Release on the Matter of 107 Cai 1150 under the Act 
Governing the Handling of Ill-Gotten Assets by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations—Ill-
Gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee v. Kuomintang, Central Investment Company and Hsinyutai Co], 
(effective Aug. 2, 2018), jirs.judicial.gov.tw/GNNWS/NNWSS002.asp?id=355762.  
100  Cujin Zhuanxing Zhengyi Tiaoli (促進轉型正義條例) [the Act on the Promotion of Transitional 
Justice] (promulgated by the Legislative Yuan, effective Dec. 27, 2017) (Taiwan); Wang Jiyou (王己由), 
Fulianhui Rending Fusui Zuzhi Faguan Shengqing Shixian (婦聯會認定附隨組織 法官聲請釋憲) [Judge 
Petitions to the Constitution Court in the Case of the Chinese Women's League Determined to be a KMT 
Affiliate Organization], ZHONGGUO SHIBAO ( 中 國 時 報 ) [CHINA TIMES] (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20190307003807-260402.  
101 Cujin Zhuanxing Zhengyi Tiaoli (促進轉型正義條例) [The Act on the Promotion of Transitional 
Justice] (promulgated by the Legislative Yuan, effective Dec. 27, 2017) (Taiwan). 
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Commission are nominated by the Premier and approved by the Legislative 
Yuan.102  
A few months into operation, however, the credibility of the 
Transitional Justice Commission was severely challenged by a scandal. The 
Commission’s then vice- chairperson, Chang Tien-chin, privately revealed his 
intention to manipulate public opinion against the KMT’s New Taipei City 
mayoral candidate, Hou You-yi, who had been a police chief during the 
authoritarian regime.103  During that time, Hou had overseen the arrest of 
democracy activist Deng Nan-jung in an operation that ended with Deng’s 
self-immolation. Chang immediately resigned after the recording of his 
remarks was exposed in the media.104  While this episode has prompted some 
discussion on how to view individual responsibility for an authoritarian past, 
it has adversely impacted the Transitional Justice Commission’s integrity and 
impartiality.  
Also contentious are the Commission’s proposals to remove 
authoritarian symbols from public spaces, most notably numerous statues of 
Chiang Kai-shek in schools and parks, and to remove his image from 
Taiwan’s currency.105  The proposals have met strong resistance from the 
KMT, which criticizes these measures as excessive and costly.106 
There are other developments that have faced less opposition from the 
KMT, which has primarily been concerned with fighting the implementation 
of the Illicit Assets Act and the government plan to remove Chiang Kai-shek’s 
symbols. A draft of the Political Archives Act [政治檔案法], for example, is 
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in the works and may soon be deliberated on by the Legislative Yuan.107 Its 
purpose is to open more political case files from both the 2-28 massacre and 
the White Terror, including private documents.108 Another development is the 
power granted to the Transitional Justice Commission, in accordance with 
Article 6, paragraph 3 of the Transitional Justice Act, to revoke verdicts for 
people who were unjustly convicted during the authoritarian era. As of 
December 2018, over 2,700 people had had their criminal convictions 
nullified, including indigenous victims.109  
While many new projects are underway, Taiwan, as mentioned, has 
largely refrained from examining abuses committed by Japan during the 
colonial era. The political parties in Taiwan, the KMT and the DPP, have 
generally glossed over episodes such as the Wushe Incident, as well as Japan’s 
exploitive colonial policies toward the island. The 1990s did bring a cathartic 
outburst of Taiwanese memories of Japanese war atrocities, particularly about 
the “comfort women,” which led to wide societal attention and a subsequent 
governmental demand for a Japanese apology.110 Since then, however, the 
salience of the “comfort women” issue has waned.111 As Yinan He notes, 
“compared to the detailed documentation of the February 28 incident, 
Taiwanese textbooks typically mentioned the “comfort women” merely in 
passing.”112  As a result, the dark period under Japanese colonization has 
simply been swept under the rug for much of the time,113 and remains so in 
the current new transitional justice regime.  
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V. CHALLENGES OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN TAIWAN 
Many significant questions have been left unaddressed by Taiwan’s 
still-evolving transitional justice regime. The problem of impunity remains 
unexamined.114 Whether to incorporate criminal accountability, vetting and 
lustration for those who contributed to the state oppression and violence 
during the authoritarian period, as some local scholars advocate, has not 
received the serious discussion it deserves. Even if it were to be thoroughly 
debated in a public forum, the possibility of reaching a consensus on the 
necessity and scope of retributive measures is low in the foreseeable future. 
The current government and legislature also show no interest in establishing 
a truth and reconciliation commission, as President Tsai promised in her 
inaugural address.  
More profoundly, in our view, Taiwan’s transitional justice is being 
confronted with a variety of social and political challenges. First, the process 
of transitional justice in Taiwan has been greatly affected by the partisan 
conflicts between the KMT and the DPP and their different views on the 
island’s authoritarian past.115 Take, for example, the current DPP’s project to 
have the KMT return illicit assets. While the DPP claims that such a measure 
is aimed at fulfilling transitional justice and leveling the political field for fair 
democratic competition, it is viewed by the KMT to be the DPP’s political 
agenda to directly challenge the KMT’s ultimate legitimacy and power base. 
The KMT harshly criticizes the Illicit Assets Act as “an evil law that is illegal, 
unconstitutional and anti-democratic, one that is aimed at establishing a ‘one-
party dictatorship.’” 116  This kind of narrative appears to stigmatize 
transitional justice by reducing it to nothing but political ploys to make one’s 
enemy suffer. Indeed, Taiwan’s transitional justice, as noted by Jau-Yuan 
Hwang, is “often portrayed as a power game between the DPP (or Pan-Green 
Camp) and KMT (or Pan-Blue Camp), instead of a justice struggle for the 
good of democracy and Taiwan in its entirety.”117 How to implement more 
vigorous transitional justice mechanisms in Taiwan without having their 
integrity and credibility undermined by a political agenda remains a 
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formidable task. 118  All political actors have a responsibility to resist the 
temptation of scoring political points and to see transitional justice as a shared 
goal, but, in Taiwan’s fierce partisan politics, it is challenging to uphold this 
ideal. In this political environment, any robust new measures are unlikely to 
be sustained, as a change of government can disrupt progress at any time. 
Relatedly, Taiwan’s transitional justice is deeply intertwined with 
identity politics. The demands for justice for the 2-28 Incident—which 
represented conflicts between waishengren and benshengren—have long 
been linked with the issue of Taiwanese identity and even the pursuit of 
independence from China. 119  This conflation of transitional justice and 
identity politics may derail the pursuit of real justice and reconciliation. 
Identity questions in Taiwan, much like ethnic issues in other countries, often 
are issues on which compromise is extremely difficult. This raises the 
question of how effective transitional justice mechanisms can be to alleviate 
Taiwan’s identity conflicts in the pursuit of social reconciliation.   
Second, needless to say, transitional justice should be engaged in ways 
that respect the rule of law and human rights. The many lawsuits pending in 
the courts regarding illicit party assets, as well as the questions of the 
constitutionality of the Illicit Assets Act, if not resolved impartially and in a 
timely fashion, may threaten this core principle of transitional justice. While 
one would hope that the judiciary could prove to be an impartial, trusted voice 
on these contested political-legal issues, Taiwan’s courts, which were under 
party-state control during the authoritarian era, today are still confronted with 
public distrust despite their overall impressive progress into a professional, 
autonomous judiciary.120 How to develop a transitional justice regime that 
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assures public confidence in the integrity of the rule of law in Taiwan is 
another difficult question.  
Third, the public has so far displayed only a lukewarm interest in the 
project of transitional justice despite the ongoing developments and the 
persistent advocacy and educational efforts of a few civil society groups.121 
According to a survey in June 2016, in which people ranked their top three 
issues of concern for the new government to address, only 13.9% ranked 
transitional justice among those top priorities, compared to 73.5% in support 
of improving the economy, 56.5% for addressing food safety and 37.9% for 
conducting pension and financial reforms.122 As the transitional justice regime 
further develops and inevitably encounters more controversial issues, without 
considerable social discussion and consensus, there will be increasing 
contention and confusion. An important task ahead is to engage the general 
public—young and older generations alike—to consider and deliberate why 
Taiwan should continue on its path towards transitional justice and how it 
should do so. Only when the transitional justice project has gained wide social 
support can it sustain and strengthen a democracy that thrives on justice and 
reconciliation.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Dealing with historical injustice is a dynamic and fluid process that is 
fundamentally shaped and constrained by the balance of power and socio-
political reality in a particular transitional society. Taiwan’s experience is a 
case in point. This Article provides a contextualized legal-political analysis of 
the evolution of transitional justice in Taiwan. We consider the extensive 
government oppression and atrocities that took place in the two periods before 
Taiwan’s democratization—the Japanese colonial rule and the Kuomintang’s 
authoritarian rule—and provide an updated analysis of Taiwan’s past and 
current initiatives to pursue transitional justice, as well as their constraints. 
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We further note the uneven development of Taiwan’s transitional justice 
regime in two aspects. It is mainly oriented towards restorative mechanisms 
of transitional justice with little consideration for individual accountability 
and no democratic deliberation of potential problems of impunity. The 
emphasis of the transitional justice efforts so far has been placed mainly on 
the 2-28 massacre, less on the White Terror period, and least of all on the 
human right abuses during Japanese rule, leaving Japan’s colonial injustice 
largely unaddressed. 
Taiwan must grapple with many challenges in developing a holistic, 
thoughtful approach towards transitional justice in the current social and 
political contexts. These challenges include heated partisan conflicts and the 
KMT’s resistance and discourse that stigmatize the project of transitional 
justice. There is also a conflation of transitional justice and identity politics 
that prevents the transitional justice regime from developing autonomously. 
The many pending legal complications and a general distrust of the judiciary 
further underscore the difficulty of upholding the rule of law in quest of justice. 
We also caution about the lukewarm public support Taiwan’s transitional 
justice initiatives has garnered so far. The lack of wider public engagement 
bodes ill for further development of a holistic transitional justice regime. 
Through this Article, we hope, along with Caldwell’s article, to stimulate 
further scholarship on—and public consideration for—this crucial challenge 
to today’s democratic Taiwan. 
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